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for	 11%	of	 vehicle	 related	 deaths.	 Such	 a	 disproportionate	 number	 of	 fatalities	 associated	with	
motorcycles is certainly grounds for concern.
Most studies of motorcycle fatalities attribute deaths to the avoidance of wearing helmets and 
the lack of helmet laws, speed, and alcohol usage. This study makes use of a rich panel data set 
for the period 1980 to 2010 by state and the District of Columbia to examine these factors and 
others.	It	is	the	first	study	to	differentiate	between	the	effects	of	universal	and	partial	helmet	laws	
on	motorcycle	 fatalities.	 It	also	accounts	 for	 the	effects	of	cell	phone	use,	alcohol	consumption,	
and suicidal propensities on these crashes after adjusting for a whole host of socioeconomic and 
driving related factors. The analysis is conducted using a new Bayesian technique, which examines 
the	sturdiness	of	regression	coefficients.	This	new	method	uses	statistics	referred	to	as	S-values	that	




Motorcycle fatalities continue to be of concern to public health officials, economists, and policy 
makers.  It is estimated that motorcyclists have a risk of death in a crash (measured as fatalities per 
vehicle mile) 34 times higher than experienced in other motor vehicles.1 In 2006, motorcycles (2-3 
wheel vehicles) accounted for 3% of the all motor vehicles registered in the United States.  However, 
motorcycle crashes accounted for 13.7% of motor vehicle crashes that same year.2 Looking at 
national trends, one can see that motorcycle fatalities trended downward from 5,144 in 1980 to 
2,116 in 1997. The trend then reversed, increasing to 5,312 in 2008.  In 2009, fatalities decreased to 
4,469 but then started increasing again. By 2011, the number of cyclists killed was 4,612.3
The causes of motorcycle fatalities have been attributed to not using helmets and the lack of 
universal or partial helmet laws, speeding, alcohol, and poor body protection, among others. A great 
deal of research has gone into estimating the marginal contributions of these factors. However, the 
results of these studies have not always been convincing or have resulted in significant different 
estimates of the marginal effects of these factors.4  
This paper examines the determinants of motorcycle fatalities using traditional econometric 
models and a new Bayesian technique developed by Leamer (2014, 2016).  This new technique 
extends the analysis presented by Fowles et al. (2015) to examine the sturdiness of regression 
coefficients with what Leamer refers to as S-values. The analysis employs a rich panel data set by 
state and the District of Columbia for the period 1980 through 2010.
The models examined not only consider the traditional factors found in many econometric 
studies, but this paper is one of the first to extend those models to include the effects of cell phone 
usage and suicidal propensities to motorcycle crashes.5 Both these latter two factors are recent 
additions to variables thought to influence motor vehicle crashes and  have been found significant 
in explaining motor vehicle crashes overall as seen, for example, in Blattenberger et al. (2012, 
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2013).6  In addition, unlike other studies, this research addresses the relative importance of universal 
helmet laws versus partial helmet laws in reducing motorcycle fatalities relative to a no helmet 
law requirement.7  As such, the paper focuses attention on five factors, i.e., cell phone, two helmet 
law, and alcohol effects as well as suicidal propensities after adjusting the models for various 
combinations of normalizing factors.
BACKGROUND
The Focus Variables
The 1966 Highway Safety Act attempted to address safety conditions on U.S. roadways. The act 
required states to implement a universal helmet law by imposing the risk of reducing up to 10% of 
their federal highway construction funds for noncompliance. The imposition of a helmet law was 
expected to increase helmet usage in that head injuries are the most common cause of motorcyclist 
deaths. The act resulted in 48 states adopting some measure of the law by 1976. However, there was 
strong opposition to this law by such groups as the American Motorcycle Association.  They argued 
that the act violated a citizen’s right of choice.  Alternative arguments against requiring the use of 
helmets were that they were heavy for the riders, impaired vision, and limited hearing. The outcome 
of these disagreements was the passage of the 1976 Federal Highway Safety Act, which revised the 
requirement that all riders wear helmets to requiring only those under the age of 18 to wear helmets. 
Approximately 25% of the states then either abolished or reduced the requirements of the universal 
helmet law by 1980. Another attempt to increase helmet usage was through the Intermodal Surface 
Transportation Act of 1991, which provided grants to states that imposed helmet and seatbelt laws. 
However, this law was repealed in 1995.8  
Research efforts to establish the efficacy of helmet laws were generally of two types. One 
method was to compare motorcycle fatalities (and injuries) before and after a state imposed some 
form of helmet law or, alternatively, the use of regression models to estimate the effect of helmet 
laws on fatalities.
Hartunian et al. (1983) examined the effect of the repeal of the federal helmet law on motorcycle 
fatalities. They found an increase in fatalities among the 28 states that repealed or weakened their 
helmet laws as well as a cost imposed on society of at least $180 million. Graham and Lee (1986) 
found a 12% to 22% decrease in motorcycle fatalities when a helmet law was in effect. However, 
they also found some risk-compensation behavior so that the increase in fatalities after deregulation 
of the helmet law was dissipated over time. Sass and Zimmerman (2000), on the other hand, found 
helmet laws were associated with a 29% to 33% decrease in motorcycle fatalities per capita.  Weiss, 
(1992) in examining head injuries, found that helmet laws decrease such injuries by 42%. French 
et al., (2009) using panel data for 48 states and the period 1990-2005, found a significant effect of 
universal helmet laws on motorcycle fatalities. Sass and Leigh, (1991) using a selectivity model, 
found that states with helmet laws would experience on average a lower fatality rate than states 
without such a law by less than 1%. This is clearly a very different result than what would have been 
expected, a priori, from other studies.
The above studies did not attempt to distinguish between the potential life-saving effects of 
universal helmet laws as compared with partial helmet laws. Rather, the emphasis was placed on the 
general viability of helmet laws on motorcycle fatality measures. The present study is the first, other 
than that of Fowles et al. (2015), using different Bayesian techniques, that separates these effects.
Alcohol consumption has almost uniformly been found to have a significant deleterious effect 
on motor vehicle safety in general. Although this is not a new factor for consideration, it is of such 
import that it deserves to be focused on.  Alcohol effects on overall motor vehicle fatalities have 
been found using both classical and Bayesian methods as seen in Loeb et al. (2009), Fowles et 
al. (2010), and Blattenberger et al. (2012), among others.9 French et al. (2009) did find that beer 
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consumption per capita was positively correlated to motorcycle fatalities in a statistically significant 
manner.
Blood alcohol concentration (BAC) thresholds measured in terms of grams of alcohol per 
deciliter of blood (g/dL), have also been examined in the literature regarding the influence of alcohol 
on motor vehicle crashes in general.  For example, Loeb et al. (2009) found some evidence that 
diminishing the acceptable limits on BAC to designate driving while impaired reduced vehicle 
fatalities.  Motorcycle fatalities seem to correlate similarly with alcohol usage and BAC measures 
found in general transportation studies. French et al. (2009, p. 831) note that, “An estimated 34% 
of all motorcyclists who were fatally injured in 2006 had BAC levels above 0.01 g/dL (NHTSA 
2008).  In addition, it has been demonstrated that motorcycle riders have a lower helmet usage rate 
if they were drinking as compared to non-drinkers.”10 However, French et al. (2009) did not find a 
significant effect on motorcycle fatalities when evaluating a BAC limit equal to or less than 0.08.
In addition, studies to address the effects of alcohol on safety have examined the effect of the 
minimum legal drinking age on motor vehicle crashes. The results from these studies have not been 
consistent.  For example, Sommers (1985) found a negative relationship between legal drinking age 
and fatality rates while recently, Blattenberger et al. (2012) and Fowles et al. (2010) found fragile 
results regarding the effect of the minimum legal drinking age on motor vehicle fatalities.11 Lin and 
Kraus (2009, p.716) indicate, “The effects of other possible interventions such as a minimal legal 
drinking age, …, for motorcycle riders have not been examined.”
Recently, two additional factors have been examined for their influence on motor vehicle related 
fatalities. They are the effects of cell phones and suicidal propensities.12
It is argued that cell phone usage contributes to motor vehicle fatalities due to its distracting 
effect on the driver, the reduction of attention spans, and its propensity to increase reaction time. Cell 
phone subscriptions have increased exponentially since 1985 when there were 340,000 subscribers 
to more than 310 million in 2010.13 Not only has the number of cell phones available to the public 
increased, but so has the propensity to use them for both phone use and texting. Glassbrenner 
(2005) has estimated that approximately 10% of all drivers are on their cell phones while driving 
during daylight hours. Given the apparent danger of using cell phones while driving, 14 states 
and the District of Columbia have banned their use by drivers (California, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Vermont, 
Washington, and West Virginia.)14
The statistical evidence regarding the crash effect of a ban on cell phone use by drivers has 
generally been in support of such bans but not consistently. Redelmeier and Tibshirani (1997) 
found cell phones are linked to a four-fold increase in property damage while Violanti (1998) found 
that cell phones are responsible for a nine-fold increase in fatalities. McEvoy et al. (2005) also 
found evidence linking cell phone use with motor vehicle crashes as did Neyens and Boyle (2007). 
Consiglio et al.  (2003), using a laboratory environment, found that both hand-held and hands-
free devices increase brake reaction time while Beede and Kaas (2006) found hand-held devices 
adversely affected driver performance.  However, other researchers found results inconsistent with 
those above.
Laberge-Nadeau et al. (2003) found a relation between phone use by drivers and crashes, but 
this relation diminished as their models were expanded. Chapman and Schoefield (1998) argued that 
cell phones were life-saving due to the “golden hour rule” allowing victims of crashes or onlookers 
to call for help and get quick medical responses.  The probability of surviving an accident increases 
with the speed aid can be obtained for the victim, and sufficient cell phones in the hands of the public 
(and possibly by victims themselves) increases the likelihood of a timely medical response. Sullman 
and Baas (2004) added to these findings with their investigation, which did not find a significant 
correlation between cell phone use and crash involvement. Similarly, Poysti et al. (2005) found that, 
“phone-related accidents have not increased in line with the growth of the mobile phone industry.”15
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These inconsistent results led to a study by Loeb et al. (2009) using classical econometrics and 
specification error tests where cell phones were found to have a non-linear effect on motor vehicle 
fatalities. Cell phone usage was first associated with increasing fatalities when there was few cell 
phones in use, which was followed by a life-saving effect on net with the growth of U.S. cell phone 
subscribers until slightly fewer than 100 million were in use, after which they were associated with 
increases in fatalities on net.  Since, there are over 300 million cell phone subscriptions in the United 
States, one anticipates a life-taking effect of cell phones. Blattenberger et al. (2012) and Fowles et 
al. (2010) have also demonstrated a relationship between cell phones and motor vehicle fatalities 
using Bayesian methods.
Motorcycle drivers have access to cell phones as do all other motor vehicle drivers. They can 
accommodate their cell phone activities directly through their helmets (if worn) as well as using 
devices to attach their cell phones to their bikes. One would anticipate a similar distracting effect 
and reaction time effect due to cell phone use on motorcyclists as found in the general motor vehicle 
driving population. In addition, drivers using cell phones in other types of motor vehicles may put 
motorcyclists at risk as well. However, there are no published studies we are aware of that evaluate 
the cell phone effect just on motorcycle fatalities. This present study will address that omission.16
Suicides and suicide rates have rarely been used as determinants in motor vehicle fatality 
models. However, there is some statistical evidence that suicides and motor vehicle fatality rates 
are related. For example, Phillips (1979) examined the importance of imitation and found a 31% 
increase in automobile fatalities three days following a publicized suicide. Pokorny et al. (1972) and 
Porterfield (1960) also found a relation between suicides and motor vehicle fatalities. Murray and 
De Leo (2007), using Australian data, also found a relation between suicidal propensities and motor 
vehicle collisions. One can make a case for this association based on economic grounds in that 
suicide via automobile may dismiss the stigma to the victim’s family and there may be an insurance 
component to the decision in that death due to an accident may leave the victim’s estate with an 
asset, i.e., a life insurance policy.
However, the association between suicides and automobile crashes is not consistent among 
studies. For example, Connolly et al. (1995), Huffine (1971), and Souetre (1988) found strong 
support for this relationship, while others, e.g., Etzerdorfer (1995), question the ability to determine 
if the victim of the crash was indeed a suicide. 
Most recently, Blattenberger et al. (2012), using a large panel data set and Bayesian and 
classical econometric methods, found a strong statistically significant and non-fragile positive effect 
of suicides on motor vehicle fatalities.  This leads one to consider whether suicidal propensities 
may have an effect on motorcycle fatalities. As far as we know, this has never been examined in 
prior research other than by Fowles et al. (2015) using different methods than those employed in 
this paper. Fowles et al. (2015) found some indication of suicidal influences on motorcycle fatality 
rates using classical econometric models. However, their results were fragile when using Extreme 
Bounds Analysis. Their research also used Bayesian Model Averaging procedures, which selected 
the suicidal influences on motorcycle fatality rates in only 47.1% of the models.  This must be 
normalized by the fact that millions of models were considered. S-values may add some information 
to the ambiguity these results provide.
Other Normalizing Variables
Motor vehicle speed and speed variance were considered as potentially important determinants of 
motor vehicle crashes and fatalities in general.  Speed adds utility by diminishing travel time and 
by providing, at least for some, thrills and excitement. Yet speed is associated with an increase in 
the probability of crashes and deaths. Peltzman (1975), Forrester et al. (1984), Zlatoper (1984), 
Sommers (1985), and Loeb (1987, 1988) early on found evidence of the life-taking property of 
speed. However, Lave (1985) argued that speed variance was the speed related factor that led to 
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motor vehicle fatalities. Additional evidence for this was found by Levy and Asch (1989) and Snyder 
(1989) while Fowles and Loeb (1989) found evidence relating both speed and speed variance to 
motor vehicle related fatalities. As with the case of motor vehicles in general, speed has been found 
to have an impact on motorcycle fatalities.17  
The effect of speed limits on fatality rates pertaining to the general motor vehicle fleet has 
been previously examined. These statistical results have provided varying conclusions depending 
on model specification and data used.  Forester et al. (1984) and Loeb (1991) found speed limits 
contributed to fatalities while Garbacz and Kelly (1987) and Loeb (1990) concluded that they seemed 
to reduce measures of crash fatalities. To confound matters more, Keeler (1994), Blattenberger et al. 
(2012), and Fowles et al. (2010) found varying results. French et al. (2009) investigated the effect of 
speed limits on rural interstates and found no significant effect on various measures of motorcycle 
fatalities, although they did find a negative and significant effect on measures of non-fatal injuries. 
As such, it appears as if speed limits affect motorcycle fatalities similar to that in the general motor 
vehicle population based on this limited comparison.
Measures of income are of particular interest to economists when studying motor vehicle 
crashes. Assuming that driving intensity and safety are normal goods, then the demand for each 
should increase with income.  Peltzman (1975) argued that income would have an ambiguous effect 
on crashes given its offsetting effects. The net effect of income would depend on the relative strengths 
of these offsetting effects. In addition, Peltzman argues that transitory income would have a smaller 
life-saving effect than permanent income. Furthermore, one might notice a different effect using time 
series data in an analysis, possibly portraying short-run effects, as opposed to models using cross-
sectional data which would possibly portray long-run effects. One would anticipate that income 
might also affect motorcycle purchases and then crashes. Higher incomes might induce affluent 
and older members of society to purchase large motorcycles, which might be used infrequently, 
and thus exacerbate motorcycle fatality rates. Similarly, low levels of income and high measures 
of unemployment rates might result in substituting lower powered (less expensive) motorcycles for 
automobiles and thus increase the number of motorcycle crashes.
Additional socio-economic factors used to normalize model specifications have been incorporated 
in the past.  These include measures of poverty, measures of education, and the distribution of the 
population among different age categories. One might expect young drivers to have less experience 
than older ones and thus take more risks while driving. Asch and Levy (1987), Garbacz (1990), 
Loeb (1990), and Saffer and Grossman (1987a, 1987b) find such a relationship. However, McCarthy 
(1992) and Loeb (1985) find a significant negative association between youthful drivers and fatality 
and injury measures. One might expect either of these to occur with motorcycle crashes given the 
number of older individuals purchasing motorcycles in the last two decades.18
Education levels, crime rates, and poverty have also been used as normalizing factors in models 
explaining motor vehicle fatality rates. Higher levels of education might be associated with greater 
stocks of human capital, which would be then expected to be inversely related with risky behavior. 
At the overall motor vehicle level, Blattenberger et al. (2012) did indeed find some evidence of this. 
One might expect the same relationship when one only examines motorcycle fatalities. However, 
higher levels of education are also associated with higher levels of income and there may be some 
confounding effects if higher income individuals over the age of, for example, 50, start using 
motorcycles infrequently and, as such, fail to gain significant experience driving motorcycles.
DATA
We utilize data collected on 50 states and Washington, D.C., over the period from 1980 to 2010. 
The number of motorcycle fatalities per billion vehicle miles traveled is our dependent variable. 
Our choice of explanatory variables is based on a rich literature (reviewed in the previous section) 
highlighting the importance of policy, safety, demographics, and economic determinants of fatality 
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rates. Issues related to the choice of these variables, as well as the general form of the models, are 
well described in Blattenberger et al. (2012, 2013), Fowles et al. (2010), and Loeb et al. (2009). Our 
data cover years during which there were significant changes in several important variables that 
are a priori plausible predictors of fatalities.  Notably, the data record the complex and changing 
pattern of helmet laws across states and over time. The data also capture the explosive growth in 
cell phone subscriptions from effectively zero to over 300 million. Annual subscription data at the 
state level were only available beginning in year 2000. For the earlier years we used national level 
data and imputed state level subscriptions to be proportional to state population proportions for the 
prior years.19
Another major change observed in the data relates to changes in federal law that allowed 
individual states to modify the 55-mph speed limit on their interstate highways. Our data record the 
highest posted urban interstate speed limit that was in effect during the year for each state. Within 
the data, per se blood alcohol concentration (BAC) laws vary widely, even though by 2005 all states 
and the District of Columbia had mandated a .08 BAC illegal per se law.20 Alcohol consumption, 
BAC thresholds for addressing issues of driving under the influence of alcohol, and helmet laws 
have generally been found to be significant, or of interest, as determinants of motorcycle fatalities. 
These are of particular interest given the review of the literature in the second section.
We investigate the effect of suicides on motorcycle crashes as well, in that individuals may use 
motorcycles as the instrument in such actions so as to minimize stigma and for a possible insurance/
economic benefit to the estate. In addition, suicide in the model may measure to some extent 
changes in societal risk taking or life preferences. Also, measures of the percent of young males 
in the population, the minimum legal drinking age, a measure of poverty, the unemployment rate, 
education levels, the crime rate, and real income are included in the model as normalizing factors as 
well as a time trend to adjust for changes over time not specifically picked up by the other regressors 
in the model. However, we focus in particular on five variables: cell phones, suicidal propensities, 
alcohol consumption, and two helmet factors.21 The data are organized by the geographical coding 
of states into 11 regions.22 The variables are defined and described in Table 1 along with their 
expected effects (priors) on fatality rates.23 Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 2.
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Table 1: Explanatory Variables Cross Sectional – Time Series Analysis of Motorcycle   
 Fatality Rates for 50 States and D.C. from 1980 to 2010 
 
 Description  
Expected 
Sign  
YEAR  A time trend.  - 
PERSELAW  
Dummy variable indicating the existence of a law defining intoxication of 
a driver in terms of Blood Alcohol Concentration (BAC).  
PERSELAW=1 indicates the existence of such a law and PERSELAW=0 
indicates the absence of such a law. (More precisely, PERSELAW = 1 
when the BAC indicating driving under the influence is 0.1 or lower.)  
- 
SPEED  




Dummy for Regional Fixed Effects (geographical coding from north to 
south and east to west).  
? 
BEER  Per capita beer consumption (in gal) per year.  + 
MLDA21  Dummy variable indicating the minimum legal drinking age is 21.  - 
YOUNG  Proportion of males (16-24) relative to population of age 16 and over.  ? 
CELLPOP  Number of cell phone subscriptions per 10,000 population.  + 
POVERTY  Poverty rate (percentage).  + 
UNPLOY  Unemployment rate (percentage).  + 
INCOME  Real per household income in 2000 dollars.  ? 
ED_HS  Percent of persons with a high school diploma.  - 
ED_COL  Percent of persons with a college degree.  - 
CRIME  
SUICIDE  
Violent crime rate (crimes per million persons).  




The Gini coefficient. An index measuring income einequality (0 as
complete equality and 1 as complete inequality).
+
PARTIAL
Dummy variable indicating the presence of a partial helmet law in a
given state for a given year.
-
UNIVERSAL
Dummy variable indicating the presence of a universal helmet law in a
given state for a given year.
-




Various specifications of the standard form:
(1)  Y=Xβ + µ are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares. The Full Ideal Conditions24 are assumed 
to be upheld where:
(2)  b = (XTX)-1XTY and 
(3)  µ ~ N(0,σ2I) 
with Y as the vector of fatality rates, X a matrix of explanatory variables whose composition 
conceivably varies across specified models, β a vector of unknown slope parameters, µ a vector of 
disturbance terms, σ2 a scalar variance parameter, and b the OLS estimator.
Table 3 presents a sample of regression results starting from a fully inclusive model using all 
of the variables from Table 1 to a simpler model using our focus variables along with a trend, a 
minimum legal drinking age dummy, an intercept, and regional dummies.25 The results are generally 
in compliance with our a priori expectations.  Most notably, with regard to our focus variables, 
all five (cell phones, suicides, helmet laws, and alcohol) are stable in terms of the sign of their 
respective coefficients and all are statistically significant at a 1% significance level.  Of particular 
interest is the consistent effects of both the universal and partial helmet laws.
Table 2: Selected Statistics for Cross Sectional – Time Series Analysis of Motorcycle Fatality   
 Rates for 50 States and D.C. from 1980 to 2010
Median Mean Range Standard Deviation
Fatality Rate 1.468 1.654 6.753 8.947
YEAR 1995 1995 30 0.308
PERSELAW 1 0.8937 1 0.311
SPEED 65 64.32 25 6.474
BEER 1.3 1.308 1.52 0.227
MLDA21 1 0.8684 1 0.338
YOUNG 0.19 0.1849 0.19 0.027
CELLPOP 12.856 28.221 207.571 32.238
POVERTY 12.5 13.05 24.3 3.949
UNPLOY 5.6 6.012 15.8 2.137
INCOME 22321 23749 64037 10013.310
ED_HS 81.9 80.54 39.7 7.950
ED_COL 22.3 22.82 39.7 6.003
CRIME 4455 4586 10383 1464.556
SUICIDE 12.4 12.8 24.16 3.376
GINI 0.4053 0.4102 0.261 0.036
NO LAW 0 0.09614 1 0.295
UNIVERSAL 0 0.4314 1 0.495
PARTIAL 0 0.4605 1 0.499
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Note that model ambiguity is implicit in Table 3 and thus the standard notion of significance 
level testing assuming any given model is true (the sampling distribution is known) must be relaxed. 
This issue is addressed in the following section.
BAYESIAN S-VALUES AND THE DETERMINANTS OF MOTORCYCLE FATALITY 
RATES
Although it is common to indicate regression results for a variety of model specifications, reported 
statistics are valid on the presumption of a given model’s truth.  In practice, alternative tests are 
made on competing models, each sequentially assumed to be true.  Inferences based on sequential 
search procedures are fraught with problems regarding the statistical validity of models’ reported 
summary statistics.   Bayesian theory, however, can directly address both estimation uncertainty and 
model ambiguity.  In this paper we utilize advances in Bayesian research regarding model choice 
as discussed, for example, in Key et al. (1999), and Clyde (1999).  An early investigator in model 
uncertainty was Leamer (1978, 1982, 1983) who, in a book and series of articles, dealt with speci-
fication searches.  
One Bayesian approach that addresses model uncertainty is Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA), 
developed by Leamer (1978).   It is a methodology of global sensitivity analysis that computes 
the possible maximum and minimum values for Bayesian posterior means in the context of linear 
regression models.26 One might think of this as an examination of the stability or lack of fragility 
of coefficients in the models.  This is done by examining a multitude of models, which vary in 
terms of linear combinations of different regressors.  The number of models can easily exceed 
several million.27 The global bounds are illustrated in Figure 1 for a two-variable regression model. 
A typical likelihood ellipse is centered at the OLS estimate. The other ellipse is the same shape 
and passes through the origin (the prior mean) and the OLS estimate. It contains the set of possible 
posterior means that could be obtained for all prior variance matrices that are positive definite. This 
larger ellipse is called the feasible ellipse and highlights a main drawback of EBA: that bounds are 
very wide. In this example, only the second quadrant (negative Beta1, positive Beta 2) is excluded 
as a possible joint region that could contain the posterior mean. Marginally, both Beta 1 and Beta 2 
are fragile in the sense that there are prior variance matrices that could result in negative or positive 
posterior estimates for either variable.   
That the coefficients for all variables in a regression are necessarily fragile from a global EBA 
perspective highlights the importance of the prior variance. We incorporate a new perspective on 
the prior variance developed by Leamer (2014, 2016). S-values (sturdiness statistics) reveal aspects 
of parameter fragility for minimally specified prior variance matrices that “tame” the global bounds 
from EBA. Figure 2 illustrates how S-values are obtained for a two-variable regression problem. 
As in Figure 1, we plot typical likelihood ellipses that are centered at the OLS estimate. There are 
also two circles centered at the origin that represent two iso-prior probability contours that would 
result from a prior that is centered at zero with spherically symmetric prior variances. The points of 
tangencies trace the posterior mean from zero to the OLS point. From a non-Bayesian perspective, 
this is exactly the ridge regression trace (Hoerl and Kennard (1970)).   If the prior variance increases, 
the posterior mean will fall closer to the OLS point, and if the prior variance decreases, the mean 
falls closer to the origin.  Two middle points are associated with two values of the prior variance. 
These values translate to prior R-square (variance).28 The larger prior R-square gives more weight 
to the explanatory variables in the model, and thus the trace is closer to the OLS point. In Figure 
2 there is also a shaded ellipse that contains the possible posterior means associated with all linear 
combinations of the two explanatory variables. Here, notice that the limits for Beta 2 are fragile, but 
that the limits for Beta 1 are unambiguously positive. The extreme values for means within such an 
ellipse form the basis for S-values, which are computed as the midpoint of the extremes divided by 
half their length. 
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Table 3: OLS Motorcycle Fatality Rate Models for U.S. States from 1980 to 2010 Estimates   
 and (t values)a
a Regional dummy variables were included in the regressions; all are estimated as negative and mostly 
significant given that the region including Hawaii was the reference region.  Hawaii has the highest motorcycle 
fatality rate.  The reference group for helmet laws is NO LAW.  OLS estimates using state factor variables were 
also obtained and results are similar to those above (results available upon request).  As noted above, we believe 
a time trend is an appropriate specification for the gradual improvements in technology and of permanent 
income, but we also estimated the OLS model using time fixed effects.  Again, the results are similar to those 
presented in Table 3. Significance at the 5% level is indicated by * and at the 1% level by **. 
b Coefficients on income and crime < .00001 but coded as .0001
c n = 1581
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  As suggested by Leamer (2014, 2016), useful prior R-squares are associated with values of .1 
to 1 (wide), .1 to .5 (pessimistic), and .5 to 1 (optimistic).  A pessimistic belief is that the explanatory 
variables would not account for much of the variation in the dependent variable, whereas an 
optimistic belief is that they do and thus the prior defers to the data.29   
Table 4 summarizes the findings for our variables of interest based on standardized data.30 
The column “Simple OLS Beta Coefficients” regresses the fatality rate on only the one specified 
explanatory variable and measures the pairwise correlation between the two variables.  Leamer 
argues that these simple correlations “are a feature of the data, while the ‘partial’ regression 
Figure 1: Feasible Bounds
Figure 2: Prior R-square Bounds
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coefficients are cooked up by the analyst when he or she selects the control variables.”31 A different 
sign in the simple correlation and the partial correlation then “requires scrutiny.”32 It is here that 
S-values are particularly useful. The next six columns provide lower and upper extreme values 
for the three specified prior variances, the first two for the wide prior (prior R-squared from 0.1 
to 1), the second two for the pessimist prior (prior R-squared from 0.1 to 0.5), and the third two 
for the optimistic prior (prior R-square from 0.5 to 1). The ninth column, “Multiple OLS Beta 
Coefficients,” provides the standard estimates for the complete model (the t-statistics are shown in 
the last column).   S-values for the wide and optimistic prior are in columns 10 and 11.  The shaded 
cells in Table 4 highlight aspects of model and parameter uncertainty. There are four variables, 
YEAR, BEER, MLDA, and UNIVERSAL for which all cells are shaded. For these variables, the 
signs of parameters are always the same, the absolute value of the S-values are greater than one, and 
the absolute values of the t-statistics are greater than two. These four variables exhibit the highest 
level of sturdiness. CELLPOP shows sturdiness on the basis of S-values and the S-values conform 
with t-statistics, in addition, all bounds are non-fragile. However, there is sign switching when 
viewing the SIMPLE correlation and the coefficient in the full model.  This result is due to an aspect 
of falling fatality rates when cellphones became popular. Again, when other control variables are 
introduced, CELLPOP is regarded as a sturdy variable. 
For non-Bayesians, Table 4 also demonstrates that there is agreement between calculated 
S-values and t-statistics.33 Notice that the variable YOUNG has a large optimistic S value (column 
11) and a small t statistic (column 12). This is because the bounds for the optimistic prior are not 
fragile. If one is dubious that YOUNG is an important explanatory variable, then its bounds are 
fragile (the wide prior) and the corresponding S-value as shown is less than 1. An important feature 
of this reporting style is that each reader can come to the table with his or her own attitude toward 
the importance of the variable shown.
These relationships from Table 4 are illustrated in Figure 3 with horizontal lines at the origin 
and +/- 1 and vertical lines at the origin and +/- 2.  Variables in the northeast and southwest quadrants 
are associated with more certain and sturdy estimates.   
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
One of the most important statistical problems is the task of inference in the context of parameter 
uncertainty and model ambiguity.  This challenging task is due to the magnitude of the number 
of models that need to be considered, often numbering in the millions. In this paper we have 
looked at the determinants of motorcycle crashes focusing on five specific variables, i.e., alcohol 
consumption, universal helmet laws, partial helmet laws, cell phone use, and suicidal propensities, 
after normalizing for other vehicle, economic, and other factors commonly found in the transportation 
safety literature. 
While the effectiveness of helmet laws has been investigated previously, this is the first study 
which distinguishes universal helmet laws from partial helmet laws and ranks them in importance 
based on strong Bayesian statistical criteria, i.e., S-values. Cell phone use, while considered in 
models of overall transportation safety, has not previously been examined with respect to motorcycle 
fatality rates. Finally, we consider the impact of suicidal propensities on these crashes along with the 
well-established alcohol effect.
Models are proposed to examine the above factors using a new Bayesian procedure developed 
by Leamer (2014, 2016), i.e., S-values, along with ordinary least squares. S-values, otherwise 
known as sturdiness statistics, examine parameter stability among hundreds of thousands or millions 
of potential models. The estimates are provided in three domains: a pessimistic view of the impact 
of the explanatory variables on the dependent variable, an optimistic view, and an indifferent or 
unknowing view. The reviewer of the models can then select the prior view they hold to and compare 
it to other views, or simply come to some conclusion based on their own prior belief.  In addition, we 
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compare these Bayesian estimates with that of ordinary least squares. Surprisingly, we find strong 
agreement between the Bayesian and frequentist approach, given that S-values greater than “1” 
quite often correspond to t-values of 2 or greater, both in absolute value.
Reviewing the statistical results associated with our focus variables, we find that BEER, our 
alcohol variable, has a potent effect on the motorcycle fatality rate as seen from all statistics presented. 
The “Simple” regression result has the same sign as the OLS result. All bounds reported are non-
fragile and the S-values all have values (in absolute value) greater than “1” while the t-statistics are 
greater than “2.”  This result conforms with the result found by French et al. (2009).   
The Partial Law results show a sign change between the “Simple” correlation and the partial 
correlation found in the OLS regression. The wide bounds and the pessimistic bounds are fragile, 
while the optimistic bounds are stable. Finally, the S-value for the wide bounds does not show 
relevance, given that its value is less than “1” in absolute value, while both the optimistic bounds 
and the t-statistics are favorably portrayed as having an effect on the dependent variable.  These 
inconsistent results can be compared with those associated with the Universal Law effect.  Here 
consistent results are found throughout.  That is, the “Simple” result is of the same sign as found in 
the OLS model.  In addition, all bounds, i.e., wide, optimistic, and pessimistic, are non-fragile and 
finally, the S-values reported for both the wide and optimistic bounds are greater than “1” in absolute 
value while the t-statistic is greater than “2” in absolute value.  Clearly, there is wide support for the 
importance of the universal law on motorcycle fatality rates.  
The statistical results associated with the suicide effect are not uniform.  The “Simple” correlation 
conforms to the OLS results, but both the wide and pessimistic bounds are fragile.  However, the 
optimistic bounds are stable.  Only the optimistic S-value and the t-statistic conform with reason to 
believe SUICIDE is influential.  This mixed set of results leaves one in the position of deciding the 
importance of this factor based on one’s prior with respect to optimism or pessimism.   
Finally, the results regarding cell phone usage, i.e., CELLPOP, are almost always supportive 
regarding the importance of this variable.  All bounds are stable and the S-values for both the 
wide and the optimistic bounds are greater than “1.”  In addition, the t-statistic is greater than “2.” 
Figure 3: t-statistics & S-values
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However, the “Simple” result differs from the OLS result in terms of sign. Leamer would argue that 
this requires scrutiny.  However, these results are expected.  The negative coefficient in the SIMPLE 
result is due to the association between cell phones and the time trend. Over time, the number of 
cell phones increased exponentially.  The time trend shows a strong negative association with the 
fatality rate as seen in the OLS result.  Hence, we argue that the “SIMPLE” result in this case is not 
at odds with all of the other results.  This suggests that cell phone usage is indeed a contributor to 
motorcycle fatality rates.
The statistical results, both Bayesian and classical, support potential public policies on alcohol, 
universal helmet laws, and cell phone usage as they impact motorcycle fatality rates. For example, 
they suggest stricter policing and strong fine structures be imposed on motorcyclists driving while 
under the influence of alcohol and perhaps funding for substance abuse treatment centers be 
considered by governments.34
 In addition, we have found strong evidence that universal helmet laws are superior to partial 
helmet laws.  This suggests that Congress or the states might consider imposing once again legislation 
promoting such universal helmet laws. 
Cell phone usage has been found to contribute to motorcycle fatality rates.  It is not unusual 
for motorcyclists to have the ability to use cell phones while driving along with other drivers and 
pedestrians.  Evidence has been provided at length about the effect of cell phone use on other modes 
of transportation, and perhaps this is the time to investigate the appropriateness of imposing bans 
on cell phone use on all drivers beyond the 14 states and DC where such bans exist for hand-held 
devices and expanding the ban further to include hands-free devices. This could be accomplished by 
stricter policing of such laws and a viable fine structure. 
The suicide effect was not found as significant on motorcycle fatality rates as on motor vehicle 
fatality rates in general.35  However, to review, support for this variable is found with regard to the 
consistency of signs in the “SIMPLE” and OLS results along with stable optimistic bounds and a 
large S-value associated with optimistic bounds and a large t-statistic. It may prove beneficial to 
consider this factor further since high suicide states are also high motor vehicle fatality states.36  In 
addition, suicides are a leading cause of death among young people in the United States, making it 
an important factor from a public health perspective.37  Interestingly, suicides have also been found 
to be an area of concern with other modes of transportation, in particular with railroads.38  It may be 
that suicidal propensities are measuring changes in risk taking propensities by individuals or society 
in general.  A potential avenue of future research may be to investigate the effectiveness of posting 
phone numbers/help lines for those suffering from emotional or psychiatric issues who might 
benefit from this and/or the investment of public monies to reduce reckless or violent behaviors 
while driving.39 However, it seems that suicidal propensities are not as pronounced for motorcycle 
fatalities as they are for automobile fatalities.
Endnotes
1. See Lin and Kraus (2009).
2. See NHTSA (2006).
3. See National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2011).
4. An early review of the causes of motorcycle crashes along with other transportation related 
crashes can be found in Loeb et al. (1994).
5. The only other paper investigating these, and the other focus variables mentioned as applied 
to motorcycle fatalities, is that of Fowles et al. (2015).  But that paper makes use of different 
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Bayesian techniques, i.e., Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA) and Bayesian Model Averaging 
(BMA).  The approach applied here extends that analysis and is heuristically more accessible. 
6. The general form of the models estimated and the independent variables included in the models 
are based on the general work dealing with regulations suggested by Peltzman (1975), French et 
al. (2009) and Lin and Kraus (2009). The models take into account that motorcycle fatality rates 
are related to driver characteristics, road characteristics, and a host of other socio-economic 
factors commonly found in studies dealing with crashes.
7. Universal helmet laws require all motorcyclists to wear a helmet while partial helmet laws 
require only some motorcyclists to wear a helmet. 
8. See National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), (2003) for a review of 
legislative history. 
9. See Loeb et al. (1994) for additional reviews, some showing opposite or insignificant results.
10. See Lin and Kraus (2009, pp. 712-713) for a review of this literature.  
11. See Loeb et al. (1994) for additional reviews.
12. Some preliminary work on these factors using alternative Bayesian techniques have been 
investigated by Fowles et al. (2015). 
13. See CTIA (2011). 
14. See Governors Highway Safety Association (2015) for the list of states banning cell phone use. 
15. See Poysti et al. (2005, p. 50).
16. See Fowles et al. (2015) for further discussion.
17. See Lin and Kraus (2009), and Shankar (2001).  
18. Between 1985 and 2003, the percentage of motorcycle owners who were 50 or older steadily 
grew from 8.1 to 25.1%.  See Morris (2009).
19. Our method of imputing cell phone subscriptions correlates with the actual data with a 
correlation coefficient of .9943. 
20. The per se law refers to legislation that makes it illegal to drive a vehicle at a blood alcohol level 
at or above the specified BAC level.  BAC is measured in grams per deciliter.  
21. We are interested not only in the effects of universal helmet laws and partial helmet laws, but 
which has a stronger and less uncertain effect on motorcycle fatality rates.
22. The use of regions mirrors the U.S. standard federal regions, but we isolate Alaska and Hawaii 
since they are non-contiguous.  In all analyses in the paper, the regional variables are included, 
but results are not presented.  
23. The anticipated sign for YEAR as a time trend is negative because it proxies advances in 
technology and possibly permanent income.  Poverty is anticipated to have a positive effect as 
it serves as a proxy for state infrastructure, such as improved highways, traffic enforcement, and 
faster emergency response times.  Income inequality and crime are anticipated to have positive 
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signs that may reflect social malaise or risk seeking behaviors.  These variables are discussed in 
Blattenberger et al. (2013).  As noted above, mixed results in previous literature are associated 
with young riders, so we are uncertain as to the anticipated sign of this variable.
24. See Ramsey (1974) and Ramsey and Zarembka (1971).  
25. Similar models for total motor vehicle fatality rates have been investigated in prior research 
for specification errors of omission of variables, misspecification of the structural form of the 
regressors, simultaneous equation bias, serial correlation, and non-normality of the error term 
and found to be in compliance with the Full Ideal Conditions.  See, for example, Loeb, et al. 
(2009).  In addition, see Fowles et al. (2013) and Loeb and Clarke (2009).
26. Mathematical developments are found in Leamer (1982). 
27. See, for example, Leamer (1978, 1982, 1983), Blattenberger et al. (2012, 2013), and Fowles et 
al. (2015).
28. The Bayesian natural conjugate model that corresponds with the classical model presented 
above (equations 1-3), sets the prior variance for the β’s = var(β) = v2Ikxk where Ikxk is the k 
by k identity matrix.  Bounds are obtained via the scalar v2, which is set to the minimum or 
maximum expected R-square divided by k. See Leamer (2014, 2016) for details.   Calculations 
are performed in the software R (R Development Core, 2016).  
29. A super pessimist prior is to exclude a variable from a regression, so the prior mean is at zero 
and the variance is zero as well (prior R-square zero).  In this paper, we do not consider this 
kind of strict prior.
30. Regional dummies were included as explanatory variables but results are not shown in Table 4. 
31. See Leamer (2014).
32. See Leamer (2014).
33. For the prior R-square at 1, the correlation is .9329.
34. See Chaloupka et al. (1993) and Freeborn and McManus (2007).
35. See, for example, Blattenberger et al. (2013).
36. See Blattenberger et al. (2013).
37. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2012).
38. See, for example, Savage (2007).
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Appendix 1: Data Sources 
Name Data Source
MCFATAL Highway Statistics (various years), Federal Highway Administration, Traffic Safety Facts 
(various years), National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
PERSELAW
Digest of State Alcohol-Highway Safety Related Legislation (various years), Traffic Laws 
Annotated 1979, Alcohol and Highway Safety Laws: A National Overview 1980, National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration
SPEED Highway Statistics (various years), Federal Highway Administration
BEER U.S. Census Bureau, National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism
MLDA21
A Digest of State Alcohol-Highway Safety Related Legislation (various years), Traffic 
Laws Annotated 1979, Alcohol and Highway Safety Laws: A National Overview of 1980, 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, U.S. Census Bureau
YOUNG State Population Estimates (various years), U.S. Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/population/www/estimates/statepop.html
CELLPOP Cellular Telecommunication and Internet Association Wireless Industry Survey, Interna-tional Association for the Wireless Telecommunications Industry.
POVERTY Statistical Abstract of the United States (various years), U.S. Census Bureau website http://www.census.gov/hhes/poverty/histpov19.html
UNPLOY Statistical Abstract of the United States (various years), U.S. Census Bureau
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